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Razor Market
This dissertation analyzes the men’s razor market to examine whether a monop-
olist can implement price discrimination for the complementary goods. I estimate
a demand system for razors using the random coefficient logit model with market
level sales data from the Nielsen Store Scanner dataset and individual demographic
data from the March CPS. The estimated parameters are used to construct price-
cost markups. By comparing the markups of different products, I find evidence that
Gillette uses a two-part tariff strategy. This conclusion can be generalized as that of
a monopolist setting the prices of tie-in products consistent with a two-part tariff.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
This dissertation investigates the pricing problem of a multi-product firm that has
the ability to price discrimination. Evidence from the men’s shaving razor market
confirms the hypothesis that tie-in sales can be used as a price discrimination device.
Further, the pricing schedule in this market is consistent with the two-part tariff
theory suggested by Oi (1971) and Schmalensee (1981, 2015). This conclusion is
derived by a structural empirical approach. First, I estimate a random coefficient
logit model with market level data from men’s shaving razor market in United States
between 2015 and 2016. The estimated parameters are used to compute the price-cost
markup of each product. Then I compare the markups of different products. The
results show that the dominant firm charged high markups for its disposable razors
and low markups for its cartridges. Further, the markup differences contribute to
most of the price differences. Last, the markup differences of the dominant firm’s
brands are more significant than those of a fringe competitor. The evidence suggests
that the dominant firm intentionally lowered the cartridge prices to promote sales
when it can use the price of the handle to extract the consumer surplus from the
shaving service. In other words, the tie-in nature of the men’s non-disposable razor
system is used to practice a two-part tariff pricing strategy.
It is unusual to find a firm which sells a single type of product at a uniform price
in practice. On the one hand, firms often provide more than one type of product. For
example, Toyota produces Camrys and Corollas; Cannon sells cameras and compat-
ible lenses; Sony provides a variety of products such as televisions, medical devices,
movies, and even financial services.
Further, the demands for the commodities of a multi-product firm are often inter-
related. When choosing between a Camry and a Corolla, consumers would compare
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their prices. To decide whether to buy a video game console, consumers would con-
sider the prices of games. Thus, the pricing problem of a multi-product firm is
different from that of a single-product firm; changing price for one product affects
not only the sales volume of this product but also other interrelated products. For
example, if Toyota cut the price for the Camry, it could collect more revenue from
the increasing Camry sales. However, the price cutting could attract some of the
potential Corolla buyers, and hence decreases Corolla sales. Thus, when making a
pricing policy for Camry, Toyota must consider both the gain from Camry sales and
the loss from Corolla sales. On the contrary, the products sold by a firm are some-
times complementary with each other. Take video game consoles and games as an
example, a purchaser of a video game console also needs to buy video games sold
by the same firm. Manufacturers of consoles and games know that price cutting on
consoles boosts not only console sales but also game sales, so they sometimes lower
the console price, even selling at a loss.
On the other hand, we often observe that the same or extremely similar products
are sold at different prices. For example, students usually get discounts from computer
sellers; restaurants have weekday specials; it is much cheaper to buy a pack of paper
towels than to buy them roll-by-roll. Companies often defend their price dispersion
as a reaction to cost differences; the unit cost of packaging and transporting paper
towels in the large-size pack is lower than that in the one-roll pack. Also, firms know
that students would be good customers in the future. So it would be profitable to
offer a student discount and make students loyal customers in the future.
However, one cannot neglect that price dispersion could stem from a profitable
marketing practice: price discrimination. A marketing brochure suggested that “A
key step is to avoid average pricing. Pricing to specific customer groups should reflect
the true competitive value of what is being provided” [Miles (1986), cited in Varian
(1987)]. Consumers usually have different reservation prices for the same commodity.
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Sometimes, a firm can identify the demand of its customers and, by which, segment
the customers into different groups. Then, when this firm raises price for customers
with high reservation prices, it will not lose low-type customers. It is obvious that a
discriminatory pricing policy is more profitable than a uniform pricing policy.
In practice, a firm usually provides more than one product. Further, the customers
of a firm often have different reservation prices for each of the products. Thus, a
rational firm should simultaneously consider two aspects, multi-product pricing and
discriminatory pricing, to maximize its profit. For example, Starbucks sells Espresso
in different sizes at different per-ounce prices, which could be quantity-based price
discrimination. Also, when setting the price schedule for Espresso, Starbucks should
consider the sales of Americano and Latte; that is, practice multi-product pricing.
In the case above, the product line of Starbucks had already existed; Starbucks
discriminates among consumers by price schedule on the product line. However, the
product line itself could be designed as a price discrimination device.
Some firms produce close substitutes, which are only differentiated in quality.
Then they can sell the high-quality and high-priced product to the consumers who are
willing to spend more money on it, while retaining consumers with a low reservation
price by selling them a low-quality and low-priced product. In this case, firms can sort
and segment consumers without knowledge about consumers’ types; given the price-
quality schedule, each consumer is self-assigned to the product which maximizes his
satisfaction. This type of price discrimination device, which involves a self-selection
mechanism, is called “second-degree price discrimination”.1
Further, for some complementary products, firms could design commodity bundles
to differentiate consumers. In McDonald’s, for example, customers can order the
Big Mac meal, which includes a burger, a soft drink, and a box of fries. However,
they can also buy those components separately at a slightly higher total price. By
1This dissertation uses Tirole (1988)’s classification for price discrimination. The different defi-
nitions regarding the second-degree price discrimination will be discussed in Chapter 2.
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the commodity bundling, McDonald’s can sort customers into groups with different
reservation prices for those components, and hence extract more consumer surplus.
The burgers can be consumed without soft drinks or fries. However, some com-
plementary commodities have to be used together. For example, printers cannot
work without ink; video games must be played on consoles; razor handles are useless
without cartridges. In this case, the demand for gaming, shaving, or printing has
to be satisfied with a primary good (such as the printer, console, or handle) and
an aftermarket good (such as the ink, game, or cartridge). Moreover, it is common
that a firm forces the buyers of primary goods to purchase its aftermarket goods by
arrangement or compatibility. This marketing practice is called “tie-in sale”.2
According to tie-in sales, consumers demand the service generated by the tie-
in commodities; they do not need any component without others. In addition, a
consumer normally makes the purchase decision for the primary good before buying
the aftermarket good. Further, each consumer needs one unit of the primary good,
regardless of his demand for the service. The consumers who have a high demand
for the service will buy more aftermarket goods. Lastly, once a consumer purchased
a primary good, he is tied to the aftermarket goods provided by the same firm.3
Due to the nature of tie-in sale, the pricing problem of tie-in commodities can
be explained by two-part tariff theory. A two-part tariff involves a lump-sum fee
and a unit price; that is, the consumer must pay a lump-sum fee for the right to
buy a product or service at a unit price. Take amusement parks as an example; a
visitor is charged an admission fee to get in the park while he still has to pay for each
ride. For the firm, the two-part tariff is superior to a unique price. If the amusement
park manager only charged the admission fee, he cannot distinguish the ones who
2 There are different definitions of “tie-in sale”. For example, “bundling” (selling one product
with a fixed number of another product) is sometimes called “tie-in sale”. Also, tie-in products are
not necessarily complementary. This dissertation uses a narrow definition of “tie-in sale”.
3It is not a strong assumption if this consumer signed a tie-in arrangement with the seller or the
costs of switching to another tie-in system was too high.
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are willing to pay for more rides from the ones who only want to play a few rides.
On the other hand, if the manager only charged the visitors for each ride, he cannot
extract consumer surplus, which is the part of the utility above the price for each
ride. Therefore, the two-part tariff serves as an effective price discrimination device.
It is easy to find many common features between two-part tariffs and tie-in sales.
First, to satisfy a single demand, a consumer is charged twice. Second, they both
involve a one-shot payment and a repeated payment. Thus, firms could make the
pricing policy for the tie-in commodities by way of the two-part tariff; pricing the
primary good is equivalent to charging a lump-sum fee, and pricing the aftermarket
good is equivalent to charging a unit price.
Figure 1.1: Taxonomies of Price Discrimination and Multi-Product Pricing
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tie-in sales others 
Sometimes, firms cannot employ the two-part tariff, even if they have been aware
of the profitability of discriminatory pricing for tie-in sales. Antitrust authority does
not permit tie-in practice in some markets. As a result, the manufacturer of primary
goods has to allow other firms to produce compatible aftermarket goods4. Also, a
firm must hold market power to employ a discriminatory pricing policy, while firms
are often facing fierce competition from each other. Thus, it is unclear whether a
tie-in sale is priced by way of the two-part tariff. Moreover, even if a tie-in sale was
4See in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); and Avaya
Inc v. Telecom Labs Inc, No. 14-4174 (3d Cir. 2016).
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priced by way of the two-part tariff, it is still unclear what the best pricing schedule
is.
A common view says that a firm should set a low price on the primary good
or even give it away and set a high price on the aftermarket good. Due to the
low price, more consumers buy that primary good and are locked with this firm.
Then the firm can set a high price on the aftermarket good. This view, which is
named as the “razor-and-blades model”, reveals the coordination between prices of
the two products. However, Picker (2011) raised a critical view regarding the “razor-
and-blades” model. He traced back the razor prices in the early 20th century with
historical evidence, such as advertisements in magazines. It turns out that the Gillette
company charged $5 for a razor handle with a pack of 12 cartridges and $1 for each
additional pack of 12 blades when it monopolized this market with patents from
1904 to 1921. After its patents expired, Gillette lowered the price of the original
handle set to $1 but offered a new, luxury, but compatible handle set at $5. On the
contrary, the price of the blades did not change over time. Picker concluded that
Gillette was not playing “razor-and-blades” strategy during its monopoly time. In
other words, the “razor-and-blades” strategy might not apply to all tie-in products.
The evidence provided by Picker is consistent with the predictions of Oi (1971) and
Schmalensee (1981, 2015), who suggested that a monopolistic razor company should
sell the handles at a high price and the cartridges at a low price. Facing a low
cartridge price, a consumer would like to replace it more frequently. As his cartridge
consumption increased, his willingness to pay for the razor handle also went up. Thus,
the consumer would readily accept a high handle price. For the firm, a high handle
price could not only compensate for the loss caused by lowering the cartridge price
but also extract more consumer surplus.
The main difference between the “razor-and-blade” story and the “two-part tariff”
theory arises from their assumptions about the market structure. There are two
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separat but interdependent markets: the handle market and the cartridge market.
The “razor-and-blades” story implicitly assumes that the handle market is an ex-
ante competitive market. Thus, each razor company would like to lower its razor
price to compete with each other. However, if a consumer has purchased a handle,
he is locked in to the cartridges of the same brand. Thus, each company is an ex-
post monopolist in the cartridge market and can set a high cartridge price. On the
contrary, Oi and Schmalensee assumed that a razor company is a monopolist in both
the handle and the cartridge markets. Even if being charged a high handle price, the
consumers would not switch to other brands.
When monopolizing this market (1904 – 1921), Gillette did not need to lower its
handle price to compete with anyone. So, it was feasible to use a two-part tariff
strategy during its monopoly period. However, when its patent expired, Gillette had
to lower the handle price to compete with other firms. However, when the price of
a handle was lowered, a consumer may not care about the switching cost; that is,
purchasing a new handle from another company. Thus, the handle could not lock in
the consumers. In other words, giving handles away could not help the companies
raise the prices in the blade market.
The evidence provided by Picker(2011) was not thorough enough. Gillette did set
a high handle price and a relatively low blade price during the monopolistic period.
However, it is unclear what the costs of the handle and the blade were. It is possible
that the cost made up a high percentage of the handle price but a low percentage
of the blade price. In this case, even a high handle price and low blade price could
be a “razor-and-blades” price strategy. Also, it is still unclear what pricing strategy
Gillette is using nowadays.
This dissertation examines the pricing strategy on razor handles and cartridges. I
find empirical evidence that tie-in sales (handle-and-cartridges) could be a device to
practice a two-part tariff pricing strategy. Moreover, the pricing policy used by razor
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manufacturers is consistent with what Oi and Schmalensee suggested but opposite to
the “razor-and-blade” model.
There is a small but growing body of literature regarding price discrimination
on complementary commodities. Li (2015) studied the optimal intertemporal price
discrimination schedule in the e-reader and e-books industry. She found that the
optimal pricing schedule depended on the use intensity. For avid consumers, a firm
should harvest (price-cutting over time) on the e-readers and invest (price-raising over
time) in the e-books. For the general consumers, a firm should invest in the e-readers
and harvest on the e-books. Chintagunta, Qin, and Vitorino (2018) investigated the
single-serve coffee system industry, where the coffee machine manufacturer licensed
other firms to produce coffee pods. They found the licensing agreement was asso-
ciated with less price dispersion in the aftermarket and lower prices of the primary
good. Gil and Hartman (2009) and Hartmann and Nair (2010)’s findings are closer
to this dissertation. Gil and Hartman examined concession sales at movie theaters.
They found that the demand conditions for movie tickets and concessions support
the metering strategy (setting a low price for movie tickets and high prices for con-
cessions). They also found that high-priced concessions extracted more surplus from
the customers with a higher reservation price for tickets. Hartmann and Nair (2010)
found the demand condition in the men’s razor market was feasible for setting a high
price for handles and low price for cartridges. However, they did not further examine
what pricing policy firms actually used.
Attempting to identify which pricing strategy is used by firms, Shepard (1991)
uncovered evidence that gas stations used a quality scale to discriminate among con-
sumers. The price difference of full-service gasoline between a multi-product gas
station (providing both full-service gasoline and self-service gasoline) and a single
product gas station (only providing self-service gasoline) was driven by the price
discrimination. Verboven (1996, 2002) and Cohen (2008) found that the price dif-
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ference across consumer groups could be explained by the markup difference, which
is the evidence of the price discrimination. Lakdawalla and Sood (2013) compared
the difference in the drug consumptions of insured and uninsured patients across the
markets. They found that health insurance worked as a two-part tariff arrangement.
Bonnet and Dubois (2010) examined the bottled water wholesale market and found
evidence that there existed a two-part tariff arrangement between the manufacturers
and the retailers.
This dissertation contributes the existing literature in two aspects. First, this
dissertation confirms that a tie-in sale can be used to employ the two-part tariff
strategy, and provides evidence to correct a common misunderstanding regarding the
pricing policy of razors. Moreover, this dissertation enriches the empirical literature
through the application of the random coefficient logit model in a price discrimination
study.
The rest of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II surveys the literature
in three fields. Chapter III presents a brief description of the men’s shaving razor
market. Chapter IV introduces the data and the variables. Chapter V presents the
theoretical model of the firm pricing behavior. Chapter VI discusses the empirical
strategy. Chapter VII presents the empirical results. And Chapter VIII presents the
conclusion.
Copyright c© Zheng Yang, 2019.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature regarding this dis-
sertation. Section 2.1 surveys the development of price discrimination theory with
an emphasis on self-selection price discrimination, price discrimination in competitive
markets, and empirical tests for price discrimination in practice. Section 2.2 reviews
the multi-product pricing literature, with a special emphasis on price discrimina-
tion used by multi-product firms supplying complementary commodities. Section 2.3
surveys the history of empirical industrial organization. The development of the em-
pirical approach explains why empirical tests for price discrimination emerged and
progressed in the recent decade, and why this dissertation can contribute to this
trend.
2.1 A Survey on Price Discrimination
The traditional definition of price discrimination is that price discrimination oc-
curs when two units of identical or largely similar goods are sold at different prices,
either to the same consumer or to different consumers. However, this definition fails
on two aspects. First, the price difference could reflect differences in transportation
costs, marketing costs, or packaging costs. Thus, it does not necessarily result from
price discrimination. On the other hand, even if there was no price difference, we
could not say that price discrimination does not exist – the goods sold at the same
price could be provided at different costs. Thus, a more strict definition of price
discrimination is “price discrimination is present when two or more similar goods are
sold at prices that are in different ratios to marginal costs” [Stigler (1987)].1
1Clerides (2002) compared the two definitions and studied the relevance of the difference in
empirical studies.
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Pigou (1920) provided the first careful analysis of price discrimination. The au-
thor stated that “discriminating power will sometimes exist alongside of monopolis-
tic power” and “depend essentially upon the non-transferability of the commodities
affected”. Depending on the degree of transferability of the goods, Pigou (1920) clas-
sified price discrimination into three categories. A first-degree price discrimination
involved “the charge of a different price against all the different units of commodity,
in such wise that the price was equal to the reservation price for it”. A second-degree
occurred when a monopolist set a price schedule which involved different prices for
different amounts of the good purchased. A third degree would be obtained if the
monopolist could distinguish among his customers’ preference by “practicable mark”,
separate them into different groups, and charge a separate monopoly price to each
group. According to Pigou (1920), an important prerequisite to apply price discrim-
ination is that the monopolist must have the ability for identifying and segmenting
consumers into different groups. However, firms often encounter informational and
legal obstacles to do this.
Leland and Meyer (1976) and Maskin and Riley (1984) demonstrated that even
if only the distribution of preferences of consumers was known, a monopolist was
able to sort and segment consumers by a well-designed pricing structure, called a
self-selection mechanism. Many marketing practices were shown to be effective price
discrimination in the form of self-selection, such as quality-differentiated product
lines, bundling, menus of two-part tariffs, and intertemporal price discrimination.
A common self-selection device is vertically-differentiated product line. Mussa
and Rosen (1978) demonstrated that when consumers had differentiated valuations
on the quality of a good, a monopolist could provide a quality-differentiated spectrum
of this good. Then “given this price-quality schedule, each consumer is self-assigned
to the quality that maximizes utility”. 2
2Gabszewicz et al. (1986) further examined the optimal product range for quality-based price
11
Bundling, as a price discrimination device, was first suggested by Stigler (1968).
Adams and Yellen (1976) provided a framework to explain the incentive of firms to
sell complementary goods in bundles. They showed that the profitability of bundling
could stem from its ability to sort consumers into groups with different reservation
prices, and hence to extract consumer surplus. Moreover, Lewbel (1985) demon-
strated that the bundled products were not necessarily complementary; a firm could
sell goods in a bundle, even if they were substitutes. 3
A two-part tariff is a type of price discrimination strategy that involves a lump-
sum fee and a unit price. Oi (1971) provided a formal framework to investigate
the mechanism by which a monopolist used a discriminatory two-part tariff to sort
consumers and extract consumer surplus. Murphy (1977) demonstrated that menus
of two-part tariffs were able to “cause consumers to identify themselves”. 4
Usually, products are pretty expensive when they first appear on the market; then,
price declines over time. Stokey (1979) showed that some of the price fluctuations
appeared to be for intertemporal price discrimination. That is, products were often
introduced into the market at a high price, at what time the consumers with high
reservation price bought them. When the price declined over time, the consumers
with low reservation price made their purchase. 5
Then, based on the ability for identifying and segmenting consumers, Tirole (1988)
re-classified second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. The practice used
by the monopolist who had information about consumers’ reservation prices and had
discrimination.
3Telser (1979) provided another analysis for bundling as price discrimination. Schmalensee
(1984) improved Adams and Yellen’s framework by introducing more thorough assumptions on
demand. McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) investigated the conditions under which bundling
was an optimal strategy.
4Two-part tariff is not necessary to be discriminating. Nevo (1971) demonstrated that even if
consumers were homogeneous, a monopolist could be benefited by two-part tariffs. Ng and Weisser
(1974) studied the case in which a two-part tariff was used to maximize social welfare. Schmalensee
(1981, 2015) studied the optimal two-part tariff schedule under different assumptions on demand
distribution.
5Conlisk, Gestner, and Sobel (1984) and Sobel (1984) further examined the optimal intertem-
poral price discrimination schedule under various assumptions.
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the ability for segmenting consumers was classified as third-degree price discrimina-
tion. On the contrary, the pricing strategy involving the self-selection mechanism was
classified as second-degree price discrimination.
Following Pigou (1920), the discussion of price discrimination had focused on
monopolistic markets until the 1970s. However, in light of developments in oligopoly
theory, research interest began to shift to price discrimination in competitive market.
Among the very first papers, Spulber (1979) demonstrated that there existed a non-
cooperative equilibrium for a group of firms who were able to practice price first-
degree price discrimination. Neven and Phlips (1985) and Holmes (1989) examined
third-degree price discrimination in duopolistic market. Stole (1995) studied quality-
based price discrimination with oligopoly. Yin (2004), Griva and Vettas (2015), and
Tamayo and Tan (2017) examined two-part tariffs in oligopolistic markets. Greenhut
and Greenhut (1975), MacLeod, Norman, and Thisse (1988), and Borenstein (1985)
studied competitive price discrimination within a spatial model. Those works showed
that competition could not prevent price discrimination.
The practice of the pricing strategies mentioned above (such as bundling, two-part
tariffs, quality-differentiated product lines, and price fluctuations) is not necessarily
the sign of price discrimination. For example, price fluctuation of commodities may
reflect the change in production costs; discount in a bundle may result from sav-
ing in packaging cost. Thus, the theory of price discrimination, especially within
competitive markets, calls for empirical evidence.
Benefiting from the development of New Empirical Industrial Organization, many
empirical works tested for the presence of price discrimination. Shepard (1991) exam-
ined quality-based price discrimination in a gasoline service station market. Verboven
(1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2005) examined international price discrimina-
tion in the car market. Verboven (2002) examined quality-based discrimination in
the car market. Leslie (2004) examined quality-based price discrimination in the
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Broadway theater ticket market. McManus (2007) examined quantity-based price
discrimination in a specialty coffee market. Mortimer (2007) examined quality-based
price discrimination in a VHS and DVD movie distribution market. Cohen (2008,
2011) examined quantity-based price discrimination in a paper towel market. Gil and
Hartmann (2009) examined bundling in concession sales at a movie theater. Bonnet
and Dubois (2010, 2015) examined two-part tariffs in a bottled water wholesale mar-
ket. Hartmann and Nair (2010) examined two-part tariffs in a shaving razor market.
Lakdawalla and Sood (2013) examined a two-part tariff strategy in the health insur-
ance market. Li (2015) examined intertemporal price discrimination in an e-books
and e-readers market.
2.2 A survey on Multi-Product Firm, Complementary Goods, and Price
Discrimination
It is common that a firm produces more than one type of good. Further, the
demands on the products provided by a single firm could be correlated; they could
be complements or substitutes. Among the very first works, Coase (1946) provided a
framework for analyzing the pricing problems of a multi-product firm facing interre-
lated demands. However, Coase only focused on uniform pricing for those products
and neglected price discrimination case. Clements (1951) and Bailey (1954) related
the pricing problem of multi-product firms with price discrimination. They argued
that the pricing problem of a multi-product firm was theoretically equivalent to the
pricing problem of a single-product firm employing price discrimination. However,
they did not consider the case in which a firm was able to charge discriminating prices
to each type of its products.
Stigler (1968) and Adams and Yellen (1976) demonstrated that a multi-product
firm was able to discriminate among consumers by selling its products in bundles,
no matter if the products were complements, substitutes, or unrelated. Calem and
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Spulber (1984) and Scott and Morrell (1985) studied the pricing problem when a
multi-product firm was able to employ two-part tariffs on each type of products to
discriminate among consumers. They revealed how the best lump-sum fee and unit
price for one product depend on the demand for another product.
In another case which this dissertation concerns, the two types of products pro-
vided by a single firm are tied-in. It is common that a firm produces a type of durable
good, called the primary good, and a type of consumable good, called aftermarket
good. To generate the whole service demanded, a consumer has to consume the
primary good with the aftermarket goods and vice versa. Moreover, each consumer
demanded only one primary good; the demand for the whole service was metered by
the consumption on the aftermarket goods. Bowman (1957), Burstein (1960), and
Blackstone (1975) demonstrated that a firm was able to use the nature of tie-in sales
to employ price discrimination. According to their explanations, consumers differed
in reservation price for the primary good. Even if the firm was not able to charge
discriminatory prices for the primary good to consumers, it could discriminate among
those consumers by selling them different units of aftermarket goods. Warhit (1980),
Schmalensee (1985, 2015), and Ahmadi et al. (2015) explained the pricing problem
of tie-in sales as a two-part tariff; a firm, who was providing a service, charged the
lump-sum fee for the service by selling the primary good and charged the unit price
by selling the aftermarket goods.
There is a small but growing literature regarding empirical examinations of the
discriminating pricing policy of multi-product firms. Gil and Hartmann (2009) exam-
ined the sales of movie tickets and concessions at a movie theater. Hartman and Nair
(2010) examined demand conditions in the men’s shaving razor market. Derdenger
and Kumar (2013) evaluated profitability of bundling console and video games in a
handheld video game market. Chintagunta, Qin, and Vitorino (2018) studied single-
serve coffee machines and the coffee pods market. Li (2019) examined intertemporal
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price discrimination for e-readers and e-books.
Table 2.1: Empirical Literature on Price Discrimination of Complementary Goods
Author Market Type of Price Discrimination
Gil & Hartmann (2009) movie tickets and concessions metering
Hartmann & Nair (2010) razor two-part tariff
Derdenger & Kumar (2013) consoles and games bundling
Chintagunta, Qin, & Vitorino (2018) single-serve coffee two-part tariff
Li (2019) e-readers and e-books intertemporal price discrimination
2.3 A Brief History of Empirical Industrial Organization
Before the 1930s, research on industries generally took the form of case studies,
which usually surveyed the rise and decline of a specific industry and related that
with the demand, costs, or other aspects of this industry. On the other hand, Walras
and Marshall’s perfect competition theory was prevalent at that time. However,
this theory could hardly explain any phenomenon in the real world. Thus, formal
economic theory was rarely, if ever, used in the industry studies.
Most economic historians see Chamberlin (1933), which introduced monopolistic
competition theory into economics, as the beginning of industrial organization theory.
In light of Chamberlin (1933), empirical industrial economists began to pay attention
to the relationship between the market structure and performance of an industry.
Wallace (1937) studied the Aluminum industry in the U.S. from 1888 to 1935. In
this paper, he investigated the effectiveness of control policy by analyzing how profit,
price, and capacity relied on the monopolistic elements of this industry. Wallace’s
research is among the very first studies of applying a formal economic theory to
an industry study. Following the framework of Wallace (1937), empirical industrial
organization became increasingly different from the industry studies of law schools or
business schools.
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However, people criticized those case studies from two aspects. First, those studies
generally demonstrated their propositions by literal inference and rough data; that
is, the conclusions were not based on thorough statistical evidence. Hence, those
conclusions were more or less subjective and not fully persuasive. On the other hand,
each of those studies focused on a particular industry in a particular geographic
market. Thus, it is hard to generalize the conclusion to other industries or markets.
In other words, even if a control policy was proved to be effective in the Aluminum
industry, it is hard to say that the same policy could take effect in the bottled water
industry.
Thus, mainstream empirical industrial organization studies switched from case-
study to inter-industry studies in the 1950s, when industry-level cross-section data
became available and computational costs fell off. For example, Bain (1951) found a
positive relationship between the profit rate and market concentration by cross-section
regression with the data of 42 industries from 1936 through 1940. Also, Ornstein
(1977) studied concentration ratios and advertising intensity data of 44 industries in
three years and found a negative correlation between the change in concentration and
the change in advertising intensity.
Those studies, named as structure-conduct-performance (SCP) studies, differed
from the case-study approach in three aspects. First, SCP investigates the gen-
eral correlation between a particular aspect of market structure and performance
(Bain, 1951, 1956), market structure and conduct (Ornstein, 1977), or conduct and
performance (Comanor and Wilson, 1967). On the other hand, those studies used
inter-industry cross-section data, including industry-level profit, market concentra-
tion, and other relevant information. Third, cross-section regressions were generally
applied by the researchers. Thus, compared with the case-study approach, the SCP
studies drew much more general and persuasive conclusions.
During the 1970s, critics of the inter-industry approach became prevalent. First,
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people argued that the econometric identification of causal effects used in empirical
industrial organization was questionable. As Einav, Liran, and Levin (2010) said,
“Since individual industries are sufficiently distinct, and industry details are suffi-
ciently important, that cross-industry variation was often going to be problematic as
a source of identification.” Thus, the cross-section studies rarely yielded consistent
estimates of structural parameters. Weiss (1974) discussed 46 inter-industry studies
of seller concentration. Also, Gilbert (1984) surveyed such studies of the U.S. banking
industry. They found that the conclusions among those studies were highly variable.
Weiss (1971) pointed out that “perhaps the next step is back to the industry study,
but this time with regression in hand.” In addition, the same with the case-study ap-
proach, inter-industry studies lacked formal theoretical models, especially incomplete
competition models. In other words, those studies discarded the powerful approach
of neoclassical economics.
Meanwhile, researchers found the importance of intra-industry differences upon
a firm’s profitability. Hall and Weiss (1967) found that absolute firm size tended to
result in high profit rates in the U.S. manufacturing industry. Gale (1972) found
a positive correlation between the market share and profit rate in large U.S. firms.
Moreover, Demsetz (1973) argued that, since firm size was correlated with profit rate,
efficiency differences among firms provided an alternative explanation for the positive
correlation between profit rates and concentration.
In the following decades, researchers stepped back to the intra-industry studies.
However, they had more powerful tools in hands this time. First, firm-level data
sets were growing since the late 1960s. For example, Hall and Weiss (1967) used the
records of individual firms from “The Fortune directories of 500 largest industrial
corporations”. Gale (1972) used Standard and Poor’s “Compustat” data which con-
tained twenty years of balance sheet, income statement, and stock market data for
over four hundred firms. With firm-level data sets, it was possible for researchers to
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investigate some issues within a particular industry.
Further, structural econometric models of industrial organization emerged in the
1970s. Among the very first papers, Iwata (1974) proposed a structural economet-
ric approach to investigate the price determination in oligopoly. This paper derived
conjectureal variation, which is a key concept in oligopoly, as a function of demand
and cost parameters by solving a profit maximization problem of an oligopolist. The
author measured those parameters by estimating demand and cost functions sepa-
rately. Then he calculated the numerical valuation of the conjectural variation with
parameters estimates. At last, this paper proposed a couple of hypotheses to test if
there existed a certain type of collusion among oligopoly firms. This paper provided
a framework for the following structural econometric models of empirical industrial
organization.
Moreover, the theory of incomplete competition has developed a lot since the
1960s. Researchers connected the empirical findings of intra-industry studies with
newly developed microeconomics theory, especially oligopoly theory.
Along with the advances in data, econometric methods, and economic theory, the
research interest of empirical industrial organization changed a lot. From the 1950s
through the 1960s, most of the papers focused on the correlation among market
structure, firms’ conducts, and performance. Since the 1970s, a growing number of
papers have investigated particular aspects of firms’ conducts. For example, Iwata
(1974) studied collusive behavior in Japanese flat glass industry. Schmalensee (1985)
studied the product proliferation problem in ready-to-eat breakfast cereals. Shepard
(1991) found that price discrimination based on quality differences occurred in the
gasoline retailing market.
In a review of this new trend, Bresnahan (1989) called the new form of empirical
industrial organization studies as “ New Empirical Industrial Organization” (NEIO).
He said a typical NEIO paper was an econometric model of a particular industry in
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which the specification and inference were guided by economic theory. Further, it
focused on the issues surrounding price and quantity determination in oligopoly.
In the recent thirty years, the progression in data sets and computational tech-
nology boosted the development of the New Empirical Industrial Organization.
Since the 1990s, a growing number of detailed datasets have become available to
the researchers, making research on the behaviors of consumers or firms more con-
vincing. Some public datasets document weekly transaction information of retailers
or households on the product level. For example, Nevo (2001) used the store scanner
data from International Resources Inc. (IRI) Infoscan Data Base to study collusion
in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal market. Bonnet and Dubois (2010) studied two-
part tariff contracts between retailers and manufacturers in the bottled water market
in France using household scanner data from TNS-World Panel. Further, some pri-
vate datasets provide individual-level transaction data. Then the users can apply
non-parametric tools using enormous observations. For example, Cohen, Hahn, Hall,
Levitt, and Metcalfe (2016) estimated the consumer surplus of the taxi market using
almost 50 million individual-level observations which provided by Uber.
Also, the advance in computer software and hardware greatly solved the computa-
tional issues of estimating a structural econometric model. Thus, complicated econo-
metric approaches became increasingly prevalent. Particularly, Berry (1994) and
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) proposed a numeric approach to solve the estima-
tion issue in the structural demand estimation model. Nevo (2000) provided a Matlab
package to make this approach much easier to use. Then, the Berry-Levinsohn-Pakes
approach became a workhorse model of empirical industrial organization studies.
20
Chapter 3 Men’s Shaving Razor Market
This Chapter introduces the the men’s razor market. Section 3.1 reviews the
origin of modern shaving razor with a particular emphasis on how the invention of
Gillette’s non-disposable razor system created a new business model. Section 3.2
introduces products and consumer preferences of the current razor market. Section
3.3 introduces the market structure. I find that Gillette dominates the high-end
segment of this market and other firms are fringe competitors. Thus, Gillette can
implement price discrimination in this market segment while other firms may not be
able to do that. Section 3.4 presents some stylized facts regarding the pricing strategy
in the high-end segment.
3.1 History
Untill the first half of the 19th century, the most popular shaving tool had been
the straight razor, with a single-edge blade on a wooden or metallic handle. Shaving
with the straight razor was a high-maintenance undertaking. Since the razor blade
dulled easily, the use of it involved a considerable amount of trouble in keeping the
blade sharp. The blade needed to be stropped and honed frequently, which was not
easy for a user by himself. Also, the blades could be worn out by honing and had to
be replaced at a considerable cost.
In 1847, William Henson invented the “hoe” style razor, with the blade perpendic-
ular to the handle. The blade of hoe style razor was installed to the handle by a screw,
and hence could be removed. In 1880, the Kampfe Brothers improved Henson’s razor
and invented the Star safety-razor. The Star razor had a removable wedge-shaped
blade, which was held in place by metal clips. The Henson’s and the Kampfe Broth-
ers’ razors were quite similar to modern design. However, their blade still required
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stropping before each use and occasional skillful honing.
Figure 3.1: Star Safety Razor
Sources: Kampfe, O.F., and F. Kampfe. U.S. Patent 228,904, issued June 15, 1880.
In 1904, King Camp Gillette patented his invention of a new hoe style razor.
The novelty of the Gillette razor was that blades were made of very thin sheet-steel,
unlike the bulky blade of the traditional hoe style razor. Thus, the blade required
a small amount of material to manufacture, and hence could be produced and sold
very cheaply. Then, consumers could buy them in quantities and throw them away
when dulled; that is, stropping and honing were not needed anymore.
Gillette’s razor not only changed men’s shaving manner but also created a new
business model. Prior to the invention of the Gillette razor, shaving razors had been
a durable good. A razor could be used for a couple of years. People only replaced it
when its blade wore out due to careless maintenance or over-honing. However, since
the blade and handle of a Gillette razor were detachable and the blade was pretty
cheap, users discarded the dulled blades frequently while keeping the handles for a
longer time. Therefore, the sale of durable shaving razors was split into two parts:
the sale of durable razor handles and the sale of consumable razor blades. Further,
Gillette prevented other companies from producing compatible handles or blades by
patent. As a result, the razor sales became similar to a tie-in arrangement.
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Figure 3.2: Original Gillette Razor
No. 775,134. PATENTED NOW, 15, 1904. 
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Sources: Gillette, King C. U.S. Patent 775,134, issued November 15, 1904.
Gillette applied a novel pricing strategy for its razors. The Kampfe Brothers
sold a Star safety-razor for $1.50 and an extra blade for $1.00, which implied the
Star handle alone cost 50 cents. On the contrary, Gillette charged $5.00 for a razor
handle with a dozen blades and $1.00 for a pack of twelve blades, which implied the
handle alone cost $4.00. Even though it is hard to estimate the exact product costs
of handles, there is no doubt that Gillette razor handles were sold at a considerable
margin at that time while its blades were sold at a lower markup.
In 1903, Gillette sold 51 razors and 168 blades. In 1904, razor sales jumped to 90
thousand, and blade sales jumped to 120 thousand. Moreover, 277 thousand razors
and 1.188 million blades were sold in 1907. During World War I, Gillette got a big
breakthrough on sales; the U.S. military started issuing Gillette razors to every U.S.
serviceman. By the war’s end, they had issued 3.5 million razors and more than
32 million blades. What was far more important than a short-term sales spurt was
that millions of young males acquired the habit of home-shaving with Gillette razors.
Therefore, Gillette could dominate this market even after the original patent expired
and many competitors entered this market.
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Since then, shaving razor has been changing over time. The razor head changed
from double-edge blade to single-blade cartridge, and then to multi-blade cartridge.
The handle changed from a round wooden or metallic shaft to an anti-slip rubber
handle. Gillette and other companies started to sell disposable razors. Further,
Gillette’s main competitor changed from Auto Strop to Schick and BiC. However,
there is something which has never changed. The business model founded by Gillette
does not change at all. Nowadays, razor manufacturers still sell durable handles and
consumable blades or cartridges separately. Moreover, Gillette still dominates this
market, while the annual sales of men’s shaving equipment in the U.S. is over 3 billion
dollars.
Figure 3.3: Modern Razor (Non-Disposable)
Sources: Taub, et. al. U.S. Patent 8,793,880, issued August 5, 2014.
3.2 Products and Demand
Initially, the razors produced by Gillette and other companies were pretty similar.
However, there are over two hundred highly differentiated brands in the current men’s
shaving razor market. The main quality difference among them is the number of
blades built in a razor head, which ranges from one to six. The manufacturers claim
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that the more blades a razor has, the more comfortable the shave is. Compared with
the count of blades, other quality differences are harder to observe or measure by
researchers. For example, some brands have finer blades than the others. However, it
is hard to measure the sharpness of the blades. Also, the perceived quality is affected
by advertising. For example, by advertising, Gillette successfully sets its products
apart from other brands. However, it is hard to find a valid measurement for the
advertisements.
The brands are also differentiated horizontally. For example, Sensor 3 and Mach 3
are different brands sold by Gillette. However, there is no significant quality difference
between them. Both of them have three blades, a built-in trimmer, and a lubrication
stripe. The main differences are likely the name and the packaging design.
Another horizontal difference which this dissertation is concerned about is cat-
egory; that is, disposable or non-disposable. A disposable razor is a razor head
attached with a handle. A consumer would discard both the razor head and handle
when replacing a disposable razor. A non-disposable system, which is pretty close to
Gillette’s original design, consists of a durable handle with a replaceable cartridge.
A user of the non-disposable system can keep the handle for a long while and only
replace the cartridge in the short term.
The average quality of the non-disposable brands is higher than that of the dis-
posable brands. However, it does not mean that a non-disposable system is superior
to a disposable razor. Some brands, such as Gillette’s Mach 3 and Fusion, offer both
the disposable razor and the non-disposable system, which have the same razor head.
Since the consumers care more about the razor head rather than the handle, they
might be indifferent between a disposable razor and a non-disposable system of the
same brand.
Consumers have a variety of preferences according to those product characteris-
tics. Further, ethnicity, age, and income affect preferences profoundly. For example,
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Figure 3.4: Modern Razor (Disposable)
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Mintel’s research1 says that the low-income group is partial to the disposable razors
and that Hispanics are more likely to buy high-quality razors. Since the demographic
makeups vary across areas and change over time, we can witness distinctive prefer-
ences in the markets.
The quantity demanded also depends on consumers’ demographics. Shaving ra-
zors are non-durable; a blade wears out after some uses. A consumer would like to
replace razor blade by weeks or by months, depending on use frequency and toler-
ance for a dull blade. The use frequency relates to consumer demographics, such as
age, race, and occupation. For example, the elderly usually have little facial hair
and shave less frequently than young men. Also, compared with manufacturing jobs,
a service-based occupation forces one to pay more attention to appearance and, in
turn, requires more razors. Another significant market driver is alternating fashion.
When metrosexual is popular, men are encouraged to be as facial-hair free as possi-
ble. In contrast, when retrosexual dominates, facial hair is back to fashion. On the
1Mintel is a privately owned market search firm.
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other hand, the tolerance for a dull blade is usually determined by income; that is,
low-income people are likely to be more tolerant of a dull razor. Thus, demand may
vary by income level.
3.3 Market Structure
The men’s shaving razor market is highly concentrated. From 2015 through 2016,
the top three companies, Gillette, Schick, and BiC, contributed 64.1% of the total
sales volume. Gillette, the market leader, attained 39.0% of the total sales volume,
while Schick and BiC acquired 10.7% and 14.4% respectively. As noted above, the
count of blades is the main quality factor. Thus, I split the market into two segments
by quality. The high-end segment consists of the razors with no less than three blades,
while the low-end segment contains the razors with one or two blades.
The high-end segment is dominated by Gillette. Gillette sold 58.1% of the ad-
vanced razors; that is almost four times its largest opponent’s market share. In
contrast, the low-end segment is more competitive than the high-end. Gillette only
attained 34.5% sales volume. Schick’s market share shrank to 10.1%. And BiC ac-
quired 16.1% of this market.
In the men’s shaving market, the sales of the private-label brands are non-negligible.2
They, as a whole, seized 35.9% of the low-quality segment. The private-label brands
are often priced lower than the main-stream brands. In other words, they are price-
takers rather than price-makers. Thus, they probably do not have any market power.
However, if the purchasers of the low-quality razors are more sensitive to price, then
Gillette would also lose its market power due to the existence of the private-label
brands.
Competition also comes from outside. The established companies face increasing
2The private-label brands are the brands owned by the retailers while produced by the OEM
companies. They are often positioned as low-cost alternatives of the named brands.
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Table 3.1: Market Share
Overall Low-End High-End
Gillette 39.0 34.5 58.1
Schick 10.7 10.1 13.5
BiC 14.4 16.1 7.1
Private Label 31.6 35.9 13.2
Generic Brands 4.3 3.4 8.1
Computed with Nielsen Store Scanner Dataset (2015-
2016).
challenge from online subscription services.3 Also, spas and salons offer professional
services to customers who prefer old school grooming. Boutique retailers sell luxury
shaving products to people who view shaving as more of a ritual. Moreover, some
consumers prefer electric shavers. However, these competitors are not likely to affect
the market power of Gillette.
3.4 Pricing
There are four brands which provide both the disposable razors and the non-
disposable systems in all the markets in my sample. I can compare their prices to
find some stylized facts on pricing strategy. As Table (3.2) shows, for all of Gillette’s
brands, the prices of the disposable razors are higher than those of the cartridges.
On average, a Mach 3 disposable razor is sold at $2.85, while a Mach 3 cartridge
is sold at $2.58. A Mach 3 handle bundled with one cartridge is sold at $12.18,
which implies the handle alone costs $9.60. For Gillette’s premium brand Fusion, a
disposable razor is sold at $5.05, and a cartridge at $4.06. The handle bundled with
one cartridge is charged $14.79, and hence the implicit price for a Fusion handle is
$10.73.
3This new distribution channel was launched by Dollar Shave Club (DSC) in 2012. Consumers
can sign up through DSC’s website and subscribe to shaving plans. Then DSC charges a subscription
fee and delivers razors to the subscribers monthly. Through this marketing approach, DSC and other
shaving clubs attained a small but increasing market share.
28
Table 3.2: Unit Price and Package Size
Disposable Cartridge Handle
Price ($) Size (ct.) Price ($) Size (ct.) Price ($)
Gillette Mach 3 2.85 3.08 2.58 7.53 9.60
Gillette Fusion 5.05 2.00 4.06 5.72 10.73
Schick Quattro 2.40 3.00 2.60 5.42 9.57
Schick Hydro 5 2.91 3.50 3.30 4.88 11.90
a. The values are computed with the data from Nielsen store scanner dataset.
b. The price variable indicates the weighted average unit price of each razor.
c. The package size indicates the weighted average package size of each brand.
d. The handle price indicates the prices of the handle-cartridge bundles.
In contrast, Schick sets a lower price for disposable razors than cartridges. A
disposable razor of Quattro and Hydro 5 costs $2.40 and $2.91 respectively, while
the cartridge costs $2.60 and $3.30 respectively. Schick also charges a high price for
its handles. The implicit price for the handle of Quattro and Hydro 5 is $9.57 and
$11.90, respectively.
I also find that the average package size of the cartridges is always larger than
that of the disposable razors. The stylized facts are consistent with that Gillette
applies a two-part tariff strategy while Schick does not. However, I cannot rule out
the possibility that the price differences are driven by the package size difference.
Copyright c© Zheng Yang, 2019.
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Chapter 4 Theory Discussion
This chapter presents a theoretical model of two-part tariff based on Oi (1971)’s
framework to solve the pricing problem of a razor manufacturer. This model assumes
that a firm which possesses monopoly power in the razor market produces three
types of products: handle, cartridge, and disposable razor. The handle and cartridge,
combined as a non-disposable system, are complementary with each other, while the
disposable razor is a substitute to the non-disposable system.
This dissertation assumes that consumers have different quantity demand for ra-
zors. Section 4.1 assumes that the demand is continuously distributed. On the con-
trary, Section 4.2 assumes that there are two types of consumers: the high demand
and low demand.
Section 4.1 shows the difference between the two-part tariff strategy and linear
pricing strategy with three cases. In the first case, this firm sells the handle and
cartridge of non-disposable system using two-part tariff strategy. In the second case,
the firm sells the handle and cartridge without coordinating their prices. In the third
case, this firm only sells disposable razor. The optimal pricing policies under the
three cases show that this firm should charge a lower price for the cartridge when
practicing two-part tariffs, compared with the case without coordinating the prices of
handle and cartridge. Further, the optimal price of the cartridge in the second case
equals the optimal price of the disposable razor in the third case.
In Section 4.2, this firm simultaneously sells cartridge, handle, and disposable
razor and employs “self-selection” mechanism. This firm is assumed to have no
information about the identity of each consumer but knows the distribution of tastes.
To sort and segment the consumers, this firm must induce the high-demand consumers
to buy non-disposable system and the low-demand ones to buy disposable razor,
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which puts “incentive compatibility” constraints on the pricing problem. The optimal
pricing policy shows that the firm should charge a low price for the cartridge and a
high price for the disposable razor.
Based on the conclusions of Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, this chapter derives a
testable hypothesis: if the firm is practicing two-part tariff pricing policy on cartridge
and handle and using “self-selection” mechanism, the price of the cartridge is lower
than the price of the disposable razor.
4.1 A Continuum Model
Consider a market in which each consumer has a linear demand function for the
shaving service, q = −αp + λ. Without loss of generality, suppose that α = 1 and λ
is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Then we get a continuous distribution of
consumers whose demand curves are parallel. Facing a two-part tariff, each consumer
will choose the quantity of cartridge at first, and then compare the consumer surplus
he can get from the cartridges with the price of a handle. If the consumer surplus
exceeds the handle price, then he will purchase both the handle and the cartridges.




(λ− pc)2 −R ≥ 0, (4.1)
where pc stands for the cartridge price and R stands for the handle price. Since each
consumer who stays in the market purchases one handle, the demand function of the
handle is N = 1− λ̂, where λ̂ stands for the marginal consumer.
A monopolist should maximize its profit from the cartridges and the handles
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(λ− pc)2 −R ≥ 0, for any λ ∈ [λ̂, 1].
(4.2)
The marginal cost of the handles and the cartridges are assumed to be zero. By the
individual rationality condition, the marginal consumer is determined with
λ̂ = pc +
√
2R. (4.3)










Now suppose that this monopolist does not use the two-part tariff to price the handles
and the cartridges (in other words, this firm is using the linear pricing strategy). In
other words, it sets the price of cartridge first without taking the handles into account,














(λ− pc)2 ≥ R for any λ ∈ [λ̂, 1].
(4.6)











Last, suppose this monopolist does not offer the non-disposable system, it sells









(λ− pd)2 ≥ 0 for any λ ∈ [λ̂, 1].
(4.8)





Equation (4.4), (4.7), and (4.9) establish that
Proposition 1 Serving the same demand, the cartridge price under the two-part
tariff is above the cartridge price under the linear pricing. The cartridge price under
the linear pricing is equal to the price of disposable razor.
p2PTc < p
LP
c = pd (4.10)
The reason that the monopolist charges a smaller markup for the cartridge is: when
a consumer buys the cartridges, he also need to buy a handle to get the shave service.
Thus, the monopolist earns profits from not only the cartridges but also the handles.
Further, if the monopolist lowers the price of the cartridge, the buyer will consume
more. Then his consumer surplus from the cartridges and willingness to pay for the
handle goes up. And the monopolist can charge a higher price for the handles.
4.2 A Two-Type Model
Now consider a market with two types of consumers whose demand functions
for shaving are qL = λL − p and qH = λH − p, where λL < λH . A monopolist
offers the disposable razor or the non-disposable system to each consumer. Also, this
monopolist is implementing a self-selection mechanism: the price scheme is designed
to induce the high-demand consumers to buy the non-disposable system and the
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low-demand consumers to buy the disposable razor. In other words, the incentive
compatibility conditions must hold
1
2
(λL − pd)2 ≥
1
2
(λL − pc)2 −R,
1
2





The first equation means the low-demand consumers have no incentive to buy the
cartridges while the second equation means the high-demand consumers have no
incentive to buy the disposable razors.
Now, the firm’s problem is
max
pd,pc,R




(λL − pd)2 ≥ 0,
1
2
(λH − pc)2 −R ≥ 0,
1
2
(λL − pd)2 ≥
1
2
(λL − pc)2 −R,
1
2





where n stands for the fraction of the low-demand consumers. The first two con-
straints are the individual rationality conditions as in equation (4.2), while the last
two are the incentive compatibility conditions. Solving equation (4.12), we get the












R = (λH − cc)2 − (
n
1 + n
)2(2λH − λL − cd)2.
(4.13)
The result establishes that
Proposition 2 When a firm sets the prices of cartridges and handles as the two-
part tariff and sells the disposable razors to sort the low-demand consumers from the
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high-demand, then the price of cartridges is below that of disposables under regular
cases.1
pc < pd (4.14)
Copyright c© Zheng Yang, 2019.
1That is, λL > cd and λH > cd. The condition means both types of consumers are potential
buyers of disposable razors.
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Chapter 5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Testing the Pricing Strategy
Generally, there are two ways to identify if a firm is using two-part tariff pricing
strategy. The first is to perform tests of nonnested hypotheses to select the pricing
model which makes best prediction to the accounting price-cost margin (for example,
Bonnet and Dubois (2010, 2015)). This method requires not only accounting data
but also strong assumptions on the supply equation. Thus, it is not feasible for this
dissertation. The identifying method I will use is similar to Shepard (1991) and
Lakdawalla and Sood (2013). As discussed, the optimal cartridge price under linear
pricing is equal to the optimal disposable razor price if a monopolist sells them to the
same consumer group. Thus, the disposable razor price can be used as a benchmark
to examine the pricing on cartridges. If a firm sets the cartridge price quite lower
than the disposable razor price, it may be using two-part tariff strategy. But it is not
necessary.
The price difference is driven by three factors: demand difference, cost difference,
and pricing strategy difference. If the marginal cost of offering a cartridge is lower
than a disposable razor, then the observed price difference might result from the cost
difference. Thus, I use the ratio of markup difference to price difference to measure
to what extent the price difference can be explained by markup difference. On the
other hand, the firm may sell cartridges and disposable razors to different consumer
groups. For example, the disposable razor customers might be light users and so they
have less willingness to pay. The quality of disposable razors might be superior to
cartridges. In this dissertation, I will only compare disposable razors and cartridges
of the same brands. Thus I can control for quality differences. It is hard to decompose
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the contribution of quantity discount from the markup difference. But I can partially
solve this problem by comparing the pricing schedule of Gillette and Schick. Schick,
as a fringe competitor, is assumed to use a linear pricing strategy on cartridges. The
markup difference between disposable razors and cartridges offered by Schick can be
viewed as being driven by demand differences. So if Gillette is using a two-part tariff
strategy, we should observe that
• For Gillette, the price-cost markup of a disposable is higher than markup of a
cartridge of the same brand.
• For Gillette, the price difference between disposable razor and cartridge can be
mostly explained by markup difference between them.
• The ratio of markup difference to price difference of Gillette is significantly
higher than that of Schick.
5.2 Price-Cost Markup
The variable which this dissertation is concerned with is the price-cost markup,
which is calculated as:
markup = p−mc. (5.1)
But, it has been known that price data are accessible while marginal cost data are
not. A straightforward way to measure the marginal cost in equation (5.1) is using
accounting cost. However, this measurement is not valid in most cases. First, ac-
counting data are at firm-level rather than product-level. Thus, it is hard to estimate
the cost of each product for a multi-product company like the razor manufacturers.
Also, the input price can be used as a proxy for production cost. However, since
the observed input price might not vary across firms, the firm-level cost variation is
ignored.1 Besides that, packaging costs, transportation costs, and marketing costs
1As firms with low production costs could set a lower price, using input prices as a proxy would
underestimate their markup and get a misleading conclusion.
37
could not be captured by input prices. Furthermore, even if appropriate accounting
data are available, it is still challenging to convert accounting cost into the economic
costs and to convert average cost into marginal cost.
This dissertation applies an indirect way to estimate price-cost markups: recov-
ering them from estimated demand elasticities. Assuming that a multi-product firm






where M stands for market size, sj stands for market share of product j, and Ff
stands for product set of firm f. Solving this problem, the price-cost markup of brand
j is




−∂sr/∂pj, if ∃ r, j ∈ Ff ,
0, otherwise,
s is a J-by-1 array of market shares, and Ff indicates the product set of firm f . Thus,
the price cost markup can be recovered with the price sensitivity, ∂sr/∂pj.
5.3 Conditional Logit Model
Discrete Choice Model
Generally, ∂sr/∂pj can be estimated by regressing sr on pj. However, since the
demands for all the products are interactive, the market share of each product depends
on not only its own price but also the prices of all other brands. Thus, the curse of
dimensionality arises: if there are J products in a market, J2 price coefficients need
to be estimated, which is often too much.
The dimensionality problem calls for an alternative estimation strategy. This
dissertation estimates the demand sensitivity with the discrete choice demand model
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which was introduced by McFadden (1978). This model assumes that a consumer
has the indirect utility function:
uijt = α(yi − pjt) +Xjβ + ξjt + εijt, for j = 1, 2, ..., J, (5.4)
where yi stands for the income of individual i, pjt stands for the price of product
j in market t, Xj stands for the observed characteristics of product j, ξjt stands
for the unobserved valuation of product j which is common to all the consumers in
market t, and εijt is a mean-zero stochastic term. For simplicity, equation (5.4) can
be transformed into
uijt = αyi − δjt + εijt, (5.5)
where δjt = pjt +Xjβ + ξjt.
The income effect is introduced in a linear form, αyi. Thus, different income levels
would not make any difference to the choice and the income term will be canceled out
in the following steps.2 Also, the terms which do not vary by the individuals, that is
−αpjt +Xjβ + ξjt, are denoted as δjt. Then δjt captures the mean utility of product
j which is common to all the consumers. The last term, εijt, captures the individual
deviation from the mean utility.
An outside product is introduced to complete the consumers’ choice set. The
indirect utility function of the outside option is:
ui0t = αyi − αp0t +X0tβ + ξ0t + εi0t
= αyi + εi0t.
(5.6)
Note that the mean utility of the outside option is normalized to be zero.
2If the income effect is important, it can be modelled by an indirect utility function which is
concave to the income, such as Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) in which
uijt = ln(α(yi − pjt)) +Xjβ + ξjt + εijt.
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Product j would be selected if and only if
uijt > uirt, for r = 0, 1, ..., J, and r 6= j. (5.7)
In the real world, the consumers’ choices are diverse; no brand can acquire the
whole market. Since all the consumers sort the mean utilities in the same order, the
diversity can only be accounted by εijt.
3 The implication of this assumption will be
discussed later.
When εijt follows a Type I Extreme Value Distribution, the probability that an
individual i chooses product j is
sijt =
exp (Xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt)∑J
r=0 exp (Xrtβ − αprt + ξrt)
. (5.8)
The coefficients can be estimated by matching the predicted choice probability to
the observed consumer purchase history.4
Generally, however, the individual purchase history data are not readily accessible.
An alternative method is using the predicted market share, instead of predicted choice






exp (Xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt)∑J
r=0 exp (Xrtβ − αprt + ξrt)
=
exp (Xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt)∑J
r=0 exp (Xrtβ − αprt + ξrt)
,
(5.9)
the predicted market share is assumed to be equal to the average choice probability
of individuals, which is numerically equal to the choice probability.
3In this context, if the mean utility of product r is not the highest, then it is purchased by the
individual i∗ only when εi∗jt is high enough.
4That is, using MLE to estimate the coefficients which have the highest probability to make the
observed purchase history happen.
5Some datasets, such as the Nielsen Household Scanner Dataset, provide data about the shopping
trips of sample households. For the products which the consumers do not purchase frequently,
however, the shopping trip data cannot be used directly. Consumers buy razors every several
months. So in many of the trip observations, consumers did not purchase any of the razors. This
does not mean they do not prefer any of the inside choices. But the discrete choice model treats
it as if this consumer prefers the outside option. So using the individual shopping trip data may
significantly underestimate the mean utility of inside products.
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||S − s(X, p, ξ;α, β)||. (5.10)
The objective function in equation (5.10) is non-linear in the coefficients. Solving the
non-linear minimization problem by a search procedure is costly. Also, the method of
instrumental variables, in its most commonly used 2SLS form, cannot be applied to a
non-linear model. Therefore, the objective function of estimation problem should be
linearized. When the market share takes the form of equation (5.9), it is convenient
to apply a log-linearization: taking log on both sides of equation (5.9) yields















Then taking difference between ln(sjt) and ln(s0t) yields
ln(sjt)− ln(s0t) = δjt ≡ Xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt. (5.12)
Since Sjt and S0t are observed, equation (5.12) can be consistently estimated with the
ordinary least square regression when the structural residual term, ξjt, is stochastic
and uncorrelated with the regressors.
Endogeneity
It is common that the price variable is correlated with the structural error term,
ξjt; that is, the price variable is endogenous. The endogeneity is usually from two
sources: the unobserved product characteristics and the simultaneity.
Some of the product characteristics are observable to the consumers but unobserv-
able to the researchers. When the unobserved product characteristics are correlated
with the price, the price variable can be endogenous. For example, in the razor mar-
ket, the sharpness and durability of the blade cannot be observed by the researchers.
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But the consumers can perceive sharpness when they use it. And they are willing
to pay more for the sharper razors. Also, since it is costly to produce the sharper
blades, the sharpness is correlated with the price. As a result, the price coefficient
would be overestimated if the unobserved quality is ignored.
As Nevo (2000, 2001) suggested, a brand fixed effect can be used to control for
the unobserved product characteristics. The brand fixed effect captures the product
characteristics that do not vary by market. Then the structural error term can be
decomposed as
ξjt = ξb + ∆ξjt, (5.13)
where ξj stands for the brand fixed effect of brand b, and ∆ξjt is the market spe-
cific deviation from the mean utility. Since the brand fixed effect captures all the
product characteristics information, Xjt can be dropped out. Then equation (5.12)
is transformed into
ln(sjt)− ln(s0t) = −αpjt + ξb + ∆ξjt. (5.14)
Another source of the price endogeneity is the simultaneity problem; that is, the
price is endogenously determined by the firms’ pricing conduct. Since the razor
market is highly concentrated, a firm is a price maker. In other words, the firm is
able to react to the consumers’ taste, ∆ξjt. Then a pricing function should be
pjt = cjt + f(∆ξjt), (5.15)
where cjt stands for the marginal cost, and f(·) is a markup function. In this case,
the OLS estimation of equation (5.14) is biased.
To solve this problem, this dissertation applies the Hausman (1996) instruments,
the average prices in adjacent areas. Due to the common cost shifter, the prices in
the adjacent areas are correlated. Also, if ∆ξjt is independent across the areas, pj,−t
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would be uncorrelated with ∆ξjt. Thus, the prices of the brand in other areas are
valid IVs.
Demand Elasticities
With Hausman instrumental variables, equation (5.14) can be consistently es-
timated by a two-stage least squares regression. Furthermore, the estimated price






−αŝjt(1− ŝjt) if j = r,
αŝjtŝrt if j 6= r,
(5.16)







−αpjt(1− ŝjt) if j = r,
αprtŝrt if j 6= r.
(5.17)
Then, the price-cost markup can be derived by substituting the price sensitivity into
equation (5.3).
5.4 Random Coefficient Logit Model
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
In the conditional logit model, the random disturbance term, εijt, is assumed to
be independent by the observations, which means that a consumer’s taste on one
brand has nothing to do with his taste on another brand. This assumption, named as
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), implies several unrealistic conclusions.
As equation (5.17) shows, the cross elasticities depend only on the market share
and the price of product j. Then, if Gillette reduces the Fusion cartridge price, all
other products would lose the same size of market share, no matter if it is a close
substitute or a distant substitute. On the other hand, the own elasticity is close to
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−αpjt when the market share of each brand is small. It implies that the demand for
the low-price brand is inelastic, and then the price-cost markup of low-price brand is
high. These implications are opposite to common sense.
Individual-Specific Coefficients
One way to relax the IIA assumption is to use the nested logit model. This
model assumes that, for example, a consumer makes a choice between the disposable
razor and non-disposable razor at first, then chooses among the three-blade, the four-
blade, or the five-bladed cartridges, and finally chooses among the specific brands.
A problem with the nested logit model is that the estimated substitution pattern
heavily depends on the nesting which is determined a priori.
A more complicated way is to let the coefficients of price and other product char-







Di ∼ P̂ ∗D(D),
Di stands for the demographics of individual i. Then equation (5.5) becomes
uijt = αiyi + δjt + µijt + εijt, (5.19)
where







The individual probability to purchase product j is similar with the conditional logit
model:
sijt =
exp (δjt + µijt)∑J
r=0 exp (δrt + µirt)
. (5.20)
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exp (δjt + µijt)∑J
r=0 exp (δrt + µirt)
. (5.21)
The coefficients can be estimated by matching the predicted market share with




||S − s(p,X,D; θ1, θ2)|| 6 (5.22)
is non-linear to the coefficients. Since equation (5.21) cannot be log-linearized, a more
complicated estimation algorithm is required.
Estimation Algorithm
The contraction mapping approach, introduced by Berry (1994), can be applied
to solve the estimation problem. This approach suggests that an approximation of
the mean utility, δH·t , can be solved by computing the series
δh+1·t = δ
h
·t + lnS·t − ln (s(δh·t; θ2)), h = 0, 1, ..., H, (5.23)
where H is the smallest integer such that ||δH·t − δH−1·t || is smaller than some toler-
ance level. The approximation of mean utility, δH·t , is a function of observed market
share,S·t, and unknown coefficients, θ2. Then the mean utility function is
δjt(S·t; θ2) = −αpjt +Xjβ + ξjt. (5.24)
Unlike the conditional logit model, a generalized method of moments is applied
to estimate θ. The GMM error term is defined as
wjt = ∆ξjt ≡ δjt(S·t; θ2)− (−αpjt + xjtβ). (5.25)
Then the moment condition is
E[Z ′w(θ)] = 0, (5.26)
6For simplicity, this dissertation denotes [α, β] as θ1 and [σk, πkd] as θ2.
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where Z consists of the exogenous regressors and the Hausman instrumental variables.




where Φ is a consistent estimate of E[Z ′ww′Z].
Equation (5.27) can be solved by a non-linear search over θ. To make the search







Then equation (5.27) can be solved by searching over θ2 only.
The estimation takes the following steps:
• Select starting points for δ and θ2. The starting point of δ can be set as the
predicted value of equation (5.24). The starting point of θ2 can be an arbitrary
value.
• Perform the contraction mapping in equation (5.23) with the observed market
share S·t and the starting points of δ and θ2. Keeping θ2 fixed at its starting
point, iterate the value of δ until || lnS − ln (s(δ; θ2))|| is small enough. Then
we get an updated δ as a function of θ2.
• Calculate the GMM error term in equation (5.25) with the starting point of θ2
we got from step 1 and the value of δ we got from step 2. Then we have ω as a
function of θ2.
• Estimate the weighting matrix Φ = Z ′ωω′Z with ω we got from step 3.
• Use a search algorithm to find a new value for θ2 in equation (5.27) with the
error term we got from step 3 and the weighting matrix we got from step 4.
Then we have a new value of θ2 and a value of the GMM objective function
according to this θ2.
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• Return to step 2 and update θ2 with the value we got from step 5. Then repeat
step 2 to step 5, until the value of the GMM objective function in step 5 is close
enough to zero.
Demand Elasticities
Due to the functional form of market share equation (5.21), predicting ∂ŝjt/∂prt
and ηjt is quite complicated in the random coefficient Logit model. Given δ̂ and θ̂,














































i=1(α̂iŝijtŝirk) if j 6= r.
(5.31)
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Chapter 6 Data and Variables
This chapter introduces the data and the variables used for estimation. Section
6.1 introduces two main data sources: the Nielsen Store Scanner dataset and the
March CPS. Section 6.2 discusses how to define the product and the market. Section
6.3 shows how the variables used for estimation are constructed. Section 6.4 describes
how to construct Hausman instrumental variables.
6.1 Data
The sales volume, the price, and the product characteristics data are from the
Nielsen Retail Scanner dataset. On the other hand, the consumer demographics data
are from the CPS Annual Social and Economics Supplement (March CPS hereafter).
The sample used in this dissertation consists of 8 quarters, ranging from the first
quarter of 2015 to the last quarter of 2016, and covers 75 geographic areas.
Nielsen Retail Scanner Data
The Nielsen datasets at the Kilt’s Center for Marketing comprise the Consumer
Panel Data, the Retail Scanner Data, and the Ad Intel Data. The Retail Scanner
Data consist of the UPC-level product characteristics, the weekly pricing, the sales
volume, the promotion, and the store demographics data.
UPC (Universal Product Code) is a widely used barcode symbology for tracking
the trade items. Each item sold in the U.S. is uniquely assigned a 12 numeric digits
code. Thus, I can track the sales of a specific product no matter if it was sold in a
Walmart in New York City or a Safeway in Honolulu.
This dataset documents the information regarding product category, brand, pack-
age size, and additional characteristics of 2.6 million UPCs. For razors, the product
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category indicates if it is a disposable razor, cartridge package, or handle-cartridge
bundle. A brand is a product’s particular name (e.g., Mach 3, Fusion, or Hydro 5)
instead of its manufacturer’s name. The package size is the count of the razor heads
contained in a package. Other characteristics include the manufacturer’s name and
the counts of blades built in a razor head.
For each UPC, the retailers report weekly average prices and sales volumes. The
price variable is the transaction price rather than the list price. Thus, it reflects both
sale and non-sale prices. The Sales volume is sell-through instead of sell-in; that is,
it is the volume sold, not purchased, by the retailers.
The data are from more than 35,000 participating stores, including groceries, drug
stores, mass merchandisers, and other stores. It covers more than half of the total
sales volume of all U.S. grocery and drug stores and more than 30 percent of the mass
merchandiser sales volume. Also, the coverage varies across geographic markets. It
ranges from 1% to 86% for grocery stores and from 28% to 92% for drug stores. The
data started with 2006 and are updated annually. The updates lag by two years (e.g.,
2016 Retail Scanner data was released in 2018).
The store demographics include store chain code, channel type, and area location.
The area location is indicated by FIPS code, which uniquely identifies in which county
or state a store is located.
March CPS
The March CPS is an annual survey conducted by the United States Census
Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data report the income received
in the previous calendar year, gender, race, age, and other demographics of each
surveyed household or individual. Over 90,000 households and 185,000 individuals
are selected in order to produce accurate estimates for the entire nation.
Also, the households and individuals are from 278 selected core-based statisti-
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cal areas (CBSA hereafter), 30 selected combined statistical areas, and 217 selected
counties. The number of surveyed individuals varies across areas. For example, there
are 10,086 individuals from Los Angeles–Long Beach–Glendale of California, but only
100 individuals from Vineland–Bridgeton of New Jersey. The samples for the smaller
areas may be not wholly representative. Thus, the estimates for the smaller areas
might be invalid while the estimates for the larger areas should be more convincing.
1
6.2 Products and Markets
The definitions of the product and market should be clarified to adapt the data
to the random coefficient logit model.
Products
A product is defined by brand in conjunction with category (i.e., disposable or
cartridge). Packages of different sizes are treated as one product. Regarding this
definition, for example, Gillette’s Fusion disposable razor and cartridge are different
products. But a four-count package of Fusion cartridges is the same product as an
eight-count package. Store-owned brands and Generic brands are dropped. The
generic brands are excluded since none of them has more than 1% market share. On
the contrary, although the store-owned brands as a whole attain large market share,
each of them is only sold in certain outlets.2 All the single-blade and twin-blade
brands are dropped for the reason that none of them offer both the disposable and
the cartridge. Also the quality difference between these disposables and cartridges is
1An alternative data source is the Nielsen Consumer Panel. The Nielsen household samples
are more representative of the local demographics. However, the income variable of Nielsen is a
categorical variable which causes problems in estimation.
2Another reason why private label brands are excluded is that, since the costs of the private
label brands of the different retailers are different, it is hard to find an instrumental variable for their
prices to control for the simultaneity. A possible way to include private label is to define private
label brands sold by different retail chains as different brands.
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significant. Thus, I only investigate the high-end segment of this market. Also, the
local brands which do not cover all the geographic markets are excluded for simplicity.
The handle-cartridge bundles are dropped to make the data compatible with the
demand model. In the discrete choice model, each consumer is assumed to select one
product among numerous options. However, a consumer of the non-disposable system
is likely to buy both the cartridge package and the handle-cartridge bundle. Dropping
all non-disposable bundles is questionable. However, there are two reasons why this
treatment is acceptable. First, the handle-cartridge bundles only attain 4.43% of the
volume sales. Thus, dropping them would not severely affect the empirical results. In
addition, the vast majority of the handle-cartridge bundles contain only one cartridge.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that consumers purchase handle-cartridge bundles
mainly for the handles and the handle-cartridge bundles are not competing with the
cartridges or the disposable razors.
Under this context, the consumer choice set consists of 18 inside products (listed
in Table (6.1)), which are manufactured by three companies (Gillette, Schick, and
BiC), and an outside product. The outside product indicates the dropped products
and the distant substitutes such as electric shavers and professional services in a
salon. In other words, the outside product represents the consumption of potential
consumers who did not buy any inside products.
Markets
The market is defined by a geographic area in conjunction with a quarter. In this
dissertation, a geographic area is a core-based statistical area (CBSA) which consists
of an urban center and adjacent counties that are socioeconomically tied to the urban
center. Since the small areas do not have representative March CPS samples, the areas
which have less than 40 male individuals in the March CPS are dropped. Then, 75
geographic areas are left in the sample. Since the number of geographic areas is not
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Table 6.1: Brands Used For Estimating Demand
3-Blade 4-Blade 5-Blade
Disposable:
G Custom Plus 3 S Quattro Titanium G Fusion




B Comfort 3 Advance
B Flex 3
Cartridge:
G Mach 3 S Quattro Titanium G Fusion
G Mach 3 Turbo G Fusion ProGlide
S Hydro 3 S Hydro 5
Note: “G” represents Gillette, “S” as Schick, and “B” as BiC.
large enough, observations in different quarters are introduced to expand the sample
size. The sample consists of 8 quarters, ranging from the first quarter of 2015 to the
last quarter of 2016.
There are 600 markets in total. And, in each of these markets, there are 18
products. Then, the sample consists of 10,800 observations.
6.3 Variables
The variables used to estimate the random coefficient logit model consist of mar-
ket share, price, package size, handle price (for cartridge), cartridge dummy, maker
dummies, and brand dummies. The market share of each inside product is defined
as the ratio of the sales volume to the market size. The sales volume data of Nielsen
Retail Scanner is UPC-store-weekly level. In this dissertation, it is aggregated to the
product-area-quarterly level for estimation.
As noted, the products of different package sizes (then different UPC) are treated
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as the same product in this dissertation. Also, the manufacturers have been known
to use more than one UPC for the same product.3 Thus, it is reasonable to aggregate
the UPC-level data to the product-level. Also, it is necessary to use the aggregated
product definition. If there are too many products in the consumers’ choice space,
each of them should have a smaller market share, which causes more problems due
to the nature of the random coefficient logit model. Aggregating the UPCs to the
products helps fix this problem.
The random coefficient logit model simulates the market share with the consumer
demographics. It is hard to know the consumer demographics for each store. But
the consumer demographics in an area are accessible. Thus, the store-level data are
aggregated to the area-level. Also, the sales volume data is hugely messy week-to-
week. The sales volume can change by more than fifty percent due to promotions or
other occurrences. Aggregating the weekly-level data to quarterly-level reduces the
effect of these random disturbances.
The market size of each area is measured by the maximum total sales volume of
all the inside and outside products from 2013 through 2016. Thus, the market size
differs across areas but stays constant over time.4
The price variable is the weighted average unit price. It is calculated as the ratio
of total dollar sales to total sales count in a market. The denominator is the count
of razor heads instead of the count of packages. In other words, the price variable
represents the average price of each razor head rather than that of the package. The
package size variable is the weighted average package size. It is the ratio of the total
sales count to the number of packages sold. It has been known that a handle is sold
3They could offer a new package design to attract people who are open to change while keeping
the old design for conservative consumers.
4Cohen (2008) argues that this measurement may underestimate the real market size. As a result,
estimated price elasticities would be smaller than the actual value. An alternative way is to assume
that the market size is proportional to the male population size with a constant proportionality
factor. However, since the coverage of the Nielsen Retail Scanner data varies from less than 20% to
more than 80% across the areas, it is questionable to set a unique proportionality factor. Thus, this
measurement is not applied in this dissertation.
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with at least one cartridge, which means there is no price data for the handles. Thus,
I use the prices of the handles which are sold with one cartridge as a proxy variable.
The product characteristics are captured by cartridge dummy, blade-count dum-
mies, and manufacturer dummies. Instead of a category variable, two blade-count
dummies are used to measure the quality difference due to the blade-count difference.
Also, the manufacturer dummies are used to identify if a product is produced by
Gillette, Shick, or BiC.
According to Nevo (2000, 2001), the brand dummies are introduced to control for
those unobserved product characteristics which affect consumers’ choices but cannot
be observed or measured by economists. There are four brands (Mach 3, Fusion,
Quattro Titanium, Hydro 5) which offer both the disposables and the cartridges.
Thus, unlike Nevo’s paper, the number of brand dummies does not equal the number
of products. Also, 7 quarter dummies are used to control for seasonal fixed effects
and any time trend.
Demographic data are from the sample individuals of the March CPS. 40 male
individuals were randomly drawn from each area in each year. To exclude the outliers,
I drop the individuals of top 1% and bottom 1% income. Then the samples are
quadruplicated for eight quarters. Two variables are used to estimate consumers’
heterogeneous preferences. The income variable is the sum of the earned and unearned
income. Also, the Hispanic dummy indicates if an individual is Spanish, Hispanic, or
Latino. Summary statistics of those variables are displayed in Table (6.2).
6.4 Instruments
The price variable is instrumented by the quarterly regional average prices (Haus-
man, 1996). The 75 geographic areas are divided into 10 regions (listed in Figure
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Table 6.2: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable:
Market Share(%) 1.54 1.00 1.52 0.01 8.96
Product Characteristics:
Price 2.54 2.37 1.13 0.62 6.36
Package Size 4.65 4.69 1.52 1.78 12.39
Handle Price 6.34 6.18 1.60 2.28 14.09
Cartridge 0.39 — — 0 1
Blades = 4 0.17 — — 0 1
Blades = 5 0.28 — — 0 1
Demographics:
Income 65845 45812 42178 1933 391391
Hispanic 0.22 — — 0 1
Source: Nielsen Store Scanner Dataset (2015-2016) and March CPS (2015-
2016).








where c stands for the geographic market, Γ stands for the area, and q stands for the
sales volume. Some areas are dropped due to lacking the March CPS samples, but
their price information can be used to form the instrumental variables. Thus, even
though there is only one geographic market in Alaska, it is still possible to construct
instrumental variables for that area. The regional average prices of each quarter from
2014 Q1 through 2016 Q4 are used as instruments. Thus, there are 12 instruments
for the price variable.




Chapter 7 Empirical Results
7.1 Results from the Conditional Logit Model
As noted in section IV, the logit results cannot yield reliable price-cost markups.
However, due to computational simplicity, it is a useful method in evaluating the
instrumental variables and comparing the different specifications.
Table (7.1) displays the results of the conditional logit model. Column (1) and
(2) are according to specification (5.12), in which the independent variables consist
of the observed product characteristics. The unobserved product characteristics are
embedded in the structural error term. Column (2) uses the Hausman instrumen-
tal variables in a two-stage least squares regression. From column (1) to (2), the
price coefficient increases from −0.494 to −0.572 as expected, which implies that the
Hausman instruments alleviate the endogeneity caused by the simultaneity problem.
Columns (3) and (4) are according to specification (5.14), in which a brand fixed
effect is introduced to control for the unobserved product characteristics, and all
market-invariant product characteristics (the blade-count dummies and the maker
dummies) are dropped. Comparing the price coefficients in column (1) and (2) with
those in column (3) and (4), we find the effect of including the brand dummies is
significant, which implies that the brand fixed effect works well in controlling for the
endogeneity caused by the unobserved characteristics.
In column (4), all the coefficients have the expected signs. Thus, it is an appro-
priate benchmark to develop the random coefficient logit model.
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Table 7.1: Results from the Conditional Logit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price -0.468 -0.517 -0.838 -1.390
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.033)
Package Size 0.502 0.492 -0.016 -0.137
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Handle Price -0.002 -0.003 -0.014 -0.017
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Cartridge -0.427 -0.376 1.554 1.858
(0.062) (0.063) (0.041) (0.047)
Blades = 4 0.195 0.224 — —
(0.027) (0.028) — —
Blades = 5 1.586 1.660 — —
(0.035) (0.038) — —
Schick -1.557 -1.601 — —
(0.025) (0.026) — —
BiC -0.764 -0.818 — —




1st stage R2 — 0.763 — 0.347
1st stage F-test — 2895.70 — 476.51
Observations 10800 10800 10800 10800
R2 0.61 0.61 0.86 0.98
1st stage R2 stands for the partial R2 of excluded instruments. All the
specifications include the time dummies.
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7.2 Results from the Random Coefficient Logit Model
Estimation
The specification of the random coefficient logit model is based on equation (5.19)
which includes a brand fixed effect to control for the unobserved characteristics and
the interactions between the product characteristics and the individual demographics
to allow for the individual specific coefficients. The individual demographics are
sampled from the March CPS. The price variable is instrumented by the Hausman
IV to control for the simultaneity problem.1 The coefficient estimates are computed
by the procedure discussed in Chapter 5.4.




Price -1.967 -0.461 —
(0.272) (0.109) —
Package Size -0.632 0.676 —
(0.116) (0.122) —
Handle Price -0.027 — —
(0.011) — —
Cartridge 2.625 — —
(0.253) — —
Blades = 4 — 0.372 1.040
— (0.193) (0.415)
Blades = 5 — 2.760 5.750
— (0.483) (0.808)
GMM Objective 3.302
Table (7.2) shows the estimates of the preference parameters of the random co-
efficient logit model. The preference means, denoted as α and β in equation (5.19),
1The product characteristics variables and the individual demographics variables have been
discussed in section 5.3. The instrumental variables have been discussed in Chapter 6.4
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are presented in column 1. All the coefficients are statistically significant and have
the expected sign. The results show that a consumer’s valuation on a razor is, ceteris
paribus, negatively related to its price, package size, and the price of a compatible
handle. Also, consumers prefer cartridges to disposable razors.
The last two columns present the individual-specific preference parameters, de-
noted as π in equation (5.19). With the exception of the term “Blades = 5” interacted
with income, all the estimates are significant. The coefficients imply that the wealth-
ier consumers are more sensitive to the price and less sensitive to the size package.
Also, the richer and Hispanics are more likely to buy a high-quality razor.
Elasticities
The market-specific demand elasticities are computed with the estimated coeffi-
cients and the mean utilities from equation (5.31). Table (7.3) presents the median
of these estimated elasticities over 600 markets for the selected products. The cells
in the diagonal of the first 8 rows indicate the own-elasticities of the selected brands,
and other cells are the cross-elasticities. Cell (m,n) indicates the elasticity of brand
in row m with respect to a price change of brand in column n. All the own- and
cross-elasticities have desirable signs and magnitudes.2
2Table 7.3 shows that disposable razors have smaller own-elasticities than cartridges on average,
which means that users of disposable razors are less sensitive to the price change than the non-
disposable system users. The reason is that the users of the non-disposable system often buy more
cartridges at one time than disposable razor users. Thus, they are more likely to buy more cartridges
when the price is low and reduce the purchases when the price is high. As a result, the users of

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The market-specific price-cost markups are computed with the estimated coeffi-
cients and the mean utilities from equation (5.3). Table (7.4) presents the medians
over 600 markets for the brands which have both disposable razor and non-disposable
systems. I find, for all of these four brands, the markups on disposable razors are
higher than the markups on cartridges. Gillette earned $0.11 more profit from the
“Mach 3” disposable razor than from a cartridge of the same brand. It increases to
$0.51 for the “Fusion”. However, the differences in Gillette’s brands are much larger
than those of Schick’s brands. The average markup difference of Gillette’s brands is
$0.31, while it is $0.09 for the Schick.
Table 7.4: Median Markups and Median Prices
Markups ($) Prices ($) ∆markup
∆price
Disposable Cartridge ∆markup Disposable Cartridge ∆price
Gillette’s
Mach 3 0.88 0.77 0.11 2.85 2.58 0.27 40.7%
Fusion 1.37 0.86 0.51 5.05 4.06 0.99 51.5%
Schick’s
Quattro 0.58 0.47 0.11 2.40 2.60 -0.20 —
Hydro 5 0.48 0.41 0.07 2.91 3.30 -0.39 —
Computed with the results of the full model.
Measure of Price Discrimination
As discussed earlier, the price of a disposable razor can be viewed as the price
when a firm sells the shaving service using a linear pricing strategy. Thus, if a firm
also prices a cartridge using a linear pricing strategy, the prices of disposable razors
and cartridges should be close to each other. Moreover, as Table (7.2) shows, the
coefficient estimate of the cartridge dummy is 2.625, which means a firm can change
a higher price for cartridges than disposable razors of the same brand. In other
words, if the firm does not implement the two-part tariff strategy, a cartridge should
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be more expensive than a disposable razor. Therefore, if we find a cartridge is priced
significantly lower than a disposable razor of the same brand, the firm is intentionally
lowering down its cartridge price for the purpose of implementing the two-part tariff
pricing strategy, whereby it extracts surplus from consumers by charging a higher
price for handles.
Since the marginal costs of disposable razor and cartridge might be different, it
is necessary to partial out the cost difference from the price difference. Using the
markups in Table (7.4) and the average prices in Table (3.2), I form the measure of







, where subscript c stands for cartridge and d stands for disposable razor. This
ratio evaluates the extent to which the price differences are driven by the markup
differences. The result shows, on average, over 46% of the price differences of Gillette’s
brands can be explained by the markup differences.
This conclusion can be strengthened by comparing the ratio of Gillette’s brands
and Schick’s brands. As discussed, a firm can implement the two-part tariff strategy
only if it has market power. Since the razor market is dominated by Gillette, other
firms may not be able to use the two-part tariff strategy. Thus, for any brand made
by other firms in this market, the ratio calculated with equation (47) should be
small. Then I calculate the ratios of two brands which sell both disposable razors
and cartridges. I find the average ratio of them is 25%, which is much smaller than
Gillette’s.
To sum up, the empirical evidence is consistent with the explanation that Gillette
is implementing the two-part tariff pricing strategy in men’s shaving razor market.
Copyright c© Zheng Yang, 2019.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
Gillette is one of the most successful companies in the past one hundred years. It
has dominated the men’s shaving razor market not only because of its constantly in-
novative products but also because of its marketing strategy. Among those strategies,
Gillette’s pricing policy for its non-disposable razor system attracts researchers’ most
attention. The razor-and-blade pricing is used as a textbook example by economists,
antitrust scholars, and marketing scientists. However, researchers have different opin-
ions about Gillette’s pricing policy. Some researchers claim that Gillette sets a low
price for handles and high price for blades. In contrast, others argue that Gillette
plays a two-part tariff strategy; that is, Gillette lowers blade price and extracts con-
sumer’s surplus by increasing handle price.
This dissertation finds empirical evidence supporting the latter opinion; that is,
Gillette’s pricing policy for the non-disposable razor system is a practice of two-
part tariff. This dissertation uses the random-coefficient logit model to estimate
the demand system of men’s razors with market-level sales data in the United States
between 2015 and 2016. The estimates are used to calculate the price-cost markups of
each product. The results show that: First, the markups of cartridges are lower than
those of the disposable razors of the same brand. Second, the markup differences
can explain a large fraction of the price differences of Gillette’s brands. Last, the
ratios of the markup differences to the price differences of Gillette’s brands are much
higher than those of Schick’s brands. This evidence is consistent with the prediction
of two-part tariff theory. In other words, Gillette is using a two-part tariff strategy
in this market.
Moreover, a pair of tie-in products, such as the razor and blade, is a particular type
of complementary products. However, the pricing problem of tie-in products is much
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more complicated than that of regular complementary products. With the evidence
from the men’s shaving razor market, this dissertation helps us better understand
the pricing problem of complementary products; that is, a firm can employ two-part
tariff pricing policy for them.
This dissertation can be further extended from two aspects. First, the structural
empirical model used in this dissertation is based on a monopolist’s pricing problem
for simplicity. However, the structure of the razor market is closer to a leader-follower
model. Thus, future studies can develop a leader-follower model in which both players
use the two-part tariff strategy. It is interesting to examine if the prediction regarding
the follower’s pricing strategy derived from the theoretical model is consistent with
the empirical evidence. On the other hand, it is hard to identify a particular pricing
policy without cost side data. Thus, this dissertation uses disposable razor as a
benchmark and compares the markups of cartridges with that of disposable razors.
However, future studies can develop a thorough hypothesis test approach to make
the conclusion more convincing.




Table A: First Stage Results
Variable
(2) (4)
Est. s.e. Est. s.e.
avgp141 0.243 0.032 -0.350 0.044
avgp132 0.036 0.022 -0.015 0.023
avgp143 0.158 0.054 0.612 0.058
avgp144 -0.266 0.048 -0.398 0.055
avgp151 0.179 0.051 0.148 0.065
avgp152 -0.123 0.049 -0.144 0.068
avgp153 0.479 0.047 0.430 0.051
avgp154 -0.221 0.039 -0.166 0.040
avgp161 0.207 0.035 0.030 0.037
avgp162 -0.049 0.036 0.435 0.048
avgp163 0.394 0.048 -0.089 0.058
avgp164 -0.060 0.035 0.001 0.056
R2 0.76 0.35
F-test 2895.70 476.51
Column headings are equivalent to those of Table V. All regressions also include the
exogenous variables included in the equivalent columns of Table V. The row labeled R2
displays the partial R2 of excluded instruments. The row labeled F-test displays the
valu of the test statistic for the null hypothesis that coefficients of all variables excluded
from the demand are zero.
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Appendix B
The specification used in the random coefficient logit model is
uijt = −αpjt + β1phdljt + β2sizejt + β3cartridgej + ξb + ξt + ∆ξjt
+ π1 ∗ pjt ∗ incomeit + π2 ∗ sizejt ∗ incomeit + π3 ∗ 4BLDj ∗ incomeit
+ π4 ∗ 5BLDj ∗ incomeit + π5 ∗ 4BLDj ∗Hispit + π6 ∗ 5BLDj ∗Hispit
+ εijt.
pjt: unit price,
phdljt : the handle price,
sizejt: package size,
cartridgejt: cartridge dummy,
ξb: brand fixed effect,
ξt: time fixed effect,
∆ξjt: structural error term,
4BLDj: dummy variable, = 1 if the razor has 4 blades,
5BLDj: dummy variable, = 1 if the razor has 5 blades,
incomeit: individual income,
Hispit: hispanic dummy,







Figure C:Frequency Distribution of Price Coefficient (based on Table 7.2)
68
Appendix D
Table D: Additional Results from the random coefficient logit Model
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Variable Est. s.e. Est. s.e. Est. s.e. Est. s.e.
Means Price -1.967 0.272 -1.818 0.553 -2.470 0.631 -2.496 1.455
Package Size -0.632 0.116 -0.625 0.132 -0.675 0.224 -0.634 0.412
Handle Price -0.027 0.011 -0.024 0.008 -0.029 0.021 -0.030 0.044
Cartridge 2.625 0.253 2.446 0.503 2.956 0.701 2.932 1.498
S.D. Price — — — — -0.439 0.322 -0.568 0.588
Package Size — — — — -0.029 1.563 -0.024 2.486
4BLD — — — — — — -4.248 3.629
5BLD — — — — — — -0.671 13.008
Interaction Price -0.461 0.109 -0.414 0.152 -0.431 0.206 -0.348 0.372
w/ Income Package Size 0.676 0.122 0.725 0.168 0.667 0.185 0.633 0.309
4BLD 0.372 0.193 0.401 0.205 0.350 0.194 0.469 0.380
5BLD 2.760 0.483 2.532 0.616 2.700 0.622 2.874 2.737
Interaction Price — — -0.038 0.363 — — — —
w/ Hispanic Package Size — — 0.166 0.383 — — — —
4BLD 1.040 0.415 0.874 0.536 1.553 0.640 3.223 3.063
5BLD 5.750 0.808 5.380 1.125 6.024 1.285 6.475 3.890
GMM Obj. 3.302 3.034 2.508 1.026
Specification (iii) includes the results which are presented in Table X.
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